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  2Abstract
* 
This paper evaluates the determinants of school attendance and work of rural 
adolescents between 10 and 18 years old in 1997-1998 for a sample of Latin 
American countries. Rural adolescents are quite disadvantaged relative to their 
urban counterparts.  The share of rural adolescents studying while concurrently 
working part-time is significantly higher, household income is significantly lower,  
“supply-side” issues are an important factor in rural non-attendance, and to the 
extent that the educational attainment of the parents creates inter-generational 
persistence we find that rural youth are starting from a disadvantaged position.  
We present some statistical analysis that highlights these problems and also 
perform bivariate binary estimation to identify the determinants of these 
decisions. We find that for most countries critical determinants for making these 
choices are household income and parental education as well as household 
composition.  Further, we find that there is evidence of a significant “trade-off” 
between working and studying. Finally, inter-generational factors allow for both a 
virtuous cycle and a vicious cycle. 
 
Keywords: Latin America, labor markets, education, adolescents, employment. 
 
JEL classification: D3, J10, O54, I21. 
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  3  41. Introduction 
 
This paper evaluates the determinants of school attendance and work of rural adolescents, 
between the ages of 10 and 18 years of age in 1997-1998 for a sample of Latin American 
countries. Although a significant proportion of Latin American adolescents go to school, a high 
proportion of those rural adolescents who attend school also work. In fact, in many countries 
rural adolescents as young as 10 years of age divide their time between schooling and working.  
Ravaillon and Wodon (1999) find that child labor does to some degree displace schooling, 
although their findings are not conclusive.  Canagarajah and Coulombe (1997), on the other 
hand, conclude that there is a significant “trade-off” between child labor and schooling in Ghana. 
It has been argued that part-time schooling and concurrent child labor may not be a bad 
thing.  In the case of rural Latin America, where the family needs to count on children’s labor, 
the flexibility that allows for part-time schooling may be the only alternative to dropping out 
completely.  Although this view has some merit, it ignores the underlying question of why child 
labor is indispensable and also if this is efficient.  Baland and Robinson (2000) present a model 
of child labor and study.  A result from their model is that child labor is inefficient when it is 
used as a substitute for negative bequests (i.e., transferring income from the children to the 
parents) or when due to capital market imperfections (as a substitute for borrowing).  This model 
strongly suggests that child labor is not Pareto efficient.  This is particularly worrisome in the 
context of the severe credit constraints that many rural households face in Latin America. 
It is undoubtedly during childhood and adolescence when education has the most impact 
on individuals and it is the period when future career paths and human development are strongly 
determined.  In this sense, family background and socio-economic conditions play a crucial role 
in integrating an adolescent productively into society (Ferrando, Singh and Wulf, 1986). At that 
stage of life, environmental variables, such as family socio-economic conditions and access to 
social services, have a strong influence on adolescents’ decisions. The young adult nurtured in 
this phase will be strongly affected by his/her environment and the decisions that he or she 
makes will have an effect on the quality of life of his or her descendants. The outcome of this 
transitional phase therefore has potentially long-lasting consequences on the individual’s life as 
well as on the lives of future generations. 
One of the most important decisions that adolescents must make is whether to attend 
school and continue to improve their education or to start working and improve their own and 
  5their family’s current level of income. They can also combine both school and work or decide to 
do neither. Several studies (Saavedra and Díaz, 1997; Ferrando, Singh and Wulf, 1989) show the 
importance of education and knowledge as a condition for future career paths and wealth status. 
Ideally, a young adolescent should be in school and learning the skills that he or she will use 
later. Any disturbance in this situation will certainly have a damaging effect on their future 
career paths and will be very difficult to reverse later.  
Adolescents of lower-income families are especially prone to abandon school. The 
economic pressure felt by these families is passed on to their adolescent members, driving them 
to leave school and start working. The problem, which is carried over and felt acutely at later 
ages, is that many adolescents do not complete the necessary education for productive labor in 
the formal modern sector. In those cases, as documented for other countries (Swaminathan, 
1999), work both initially and in the future tends to be low-skilled, manual, arduous, badly paid 
and repetitive. Early work, particularly when it is time-intensive, tends to foreclose the option of 
school education and does not provide specialized work skills. 
Given high opportunity costs and low school quality, adolescents are more likely to drop 
out of school and start work early. Poor peasant economies, with the family as their economic 
unit, require the participation of all members of the nuclear family and often of the extended 
family in agricultural tasks. They all may play a crucial role in rural activities, especially during 
the harvest season. Those economic units may perceive that schooling for their children and 
adolescents represents too high an opportunity cost. In this context, it is difficult for many rural 
families to educate all of their children. Rural families depend on their wealth and borrowing 
capacity to support their children’s education, as they have to substitute their labor and pay the 
costs of education (Jacoby, 1994). Additionally, in many cases rural children and adolescents 
have to cover long distances to go to poorly equipped schools. 
In terms of public policy, providing support for the education of children and adolescents 
can have substantial economic rewards, both private and social. Many Latin American countries, 
understanding the severity of this problem, have tried to improve their educational systems both 
in terms of school coverage and quality. However, their educational systems are still greatly in 
need of improvement, particularly in rural areas. Therefore, targeted investment in education that 
addresses these issues is necessary.  
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in the improvement of their school quality. As shown by Duryea and Székely (1998), the ratios 
of children to adults are expected to fall, which opens up a “Demographic Window of 
Opportunity” to improve the effects of education in future generations. There will be a 
transitional phase in which demand for educational services is expected to grow. This young 
population will be responsible for supporting children and the elderly. Investing in their 
education will have potentially large effects not only in their own income-generating capacity, 
but also in future generations as the region experiences this demographic transition. To 
efficiently channel public resources to support the education of the next generations, it is critical 
to better understand the common problems of the region as well as country-specific aspects. In 
this context, this project tries to contribute to the existing research on determining the priorities 
of public investment in education.  
This study uses information contained in household survey data to make inferences on 
the determinants of adolescents’ decisions to study and work. These databases contain 
information that, given appropriate assumptions, can help to construct the individual forward-
looking decision process. In particular, they contain information for people of different ages and 
different backgrounds.  
The paper focuses on rural areas—which, as mentioned before, display the lowest rates of 
full-time adolescent school attendance and the highest proportion of employed adolescents.   
Rural individuals also tend to be the poorest individuals in each country and those with the 
greatest potential for improving their living conditions if external support for schooling is 
provided by public resources. This paper finds that parent income, parent education levels, and 
household composition are important determinants of the probabilities of school attendance and 
employment for rural adolescents. This implies that an improvement in living conditions in rural 
areas of Latin America can have a considerable effect in increasing educational achievement of 
rural inhabitants and their offspring. The next section presents a model based on Jacoby (1994) 
and suggests that, although this model is not fully adaptable to the cross-section of data, it does 
provide significant insight into the schooling problem.  Section 3 describes the data used in this 
study, and Section 4 contrasts urban and rural adolescents and discusses some situations specific 
to rural youth. Section 5 presents the methodology used in the estimations and discusses results 
of bivariate probit regressions on school and work decisions. Section 6 summarizes the findings. 
  72. Conceptual Framework 
 
In the literature, the educational choice has been modeled using the framework for human capital 
accumulation and labor supply.
1 The decision is basically an inter-temporal decision, which 
involves giving up current income in order to gain skills and increase income in the future.   
Jacoby (1994) presents a model in which parents are assumed to have perfect foresight 
and altruistically value a unit of their child’s consumption as much as they value of unit of their 
own. Instantaneous utlity, u(•), is assumed to be a strictly concave function of total family 
consumption C(t). At time zero, the time at which their child can enroll in school, parents select 
S(t), the fraction of time the child will spend in school each year, and C(t), in order to maximize 
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The flow rate of A(•), net financial assets, is composed of returns of asset stock, constant 
parent income (y), return to labor of the child, minus consumption.  There are no bequests, and 
human capital is accumulated with a parameter b capturing school quality, while inequalities (4) 
impose a credit constraint on the family. 
 
                                                           
1 See Schultz (1963), Ben-Porath (1967), Heckman (1976), Rosenzweig and Evenson (1977), Willis and Rosen 
(1979), Keane and Wolpin, 1997. 
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myopic agents even under the assumption of perfect foresight.  With the imposition of credit 
rationing, children at some time t0 will begin partial schooling (i.e., S(t)<1), and drop off 
monotonically until time t1 where S(t)=0. 
In the case of the family that faces non-binding credit constraints and can borrow as 





Jacoby shows that in his model, t0 can be expressed as an implicit function of b,δ,T, and 
wH0/y.  This function decreases in wH0/y, so children with high opportunity costs relative to 
household income may start school with only part time attendance S(0)<1, effectively making 
t0=0.  In this model, t1 (total attendance time) is the same in the constrained and unconstrained 
cases; the amount of human capital accumulation for the less constrained adolescent, however, is 
greater. 
These transitions are difficult to test, as cross-sectional databases and longitudinal 
information for Latin America are scarce.  Additionally, there is no significant way to test 
whether a drop-out process exists.  What is clear from comparing the graphs in Appendix 1 of 
percentages of adolescents in each of the four categories (Only School, School and Work, Only 
  9Work, and Neither) by age is that older adolescents tend to solely dedicate their time to study or 
allocate more time to labor.   
Using cross-sectional data, Jacoby (1994) analyzes the effect of borrowing constraints 
and assets on the choice of attending school in Peru. He finds that increases in family income, 
wealth, and borrowing ability significantly increase the probability that adolescents do not drop 
out of school. Levison and Moe (1998) also find a positive effect of parent income on the 
probability that girls attend school in Peru. On the other hand, Rodríguez and Abler (1998) 
evaluate, for the period 1985-1994 in Peru, the importance of income as a determinant of school 
attendance and surprisingly find that this variable has no significant influence on the decision to 
attend school or enter the labor market. Their approach has also been applied to Mexico with the 
same results (Abler, Rodríguez and Robles, 1998).  It is interesting to note that opposite results 
have been found for the same country and using the same database and period. However, it is 
hard to compare Jacoby’s and Rodríguez’s results, as the former uses an indicator of 
backwardness in school as dependent variable, whereas the latter uses school enrollment. 
Moreover, Jacoby distinguishes between self-employed income, which is highly transitory and 
found to be non-significant, and non-labor and labor income, which is found to be significant. On 
the contrary, Rodríguez and Abler use log of total income as an explanatory variable and find it 
to be non-significant.  
Related to parent income, parent wealth also seems to have a positive effect on school 
enrollment as shown by Jacoby (1994) for Peru and by Bedi and Marshall (1999) for Honduras. 
The importance of this variable highlights the importance of borrowing constraints for the 
working-studying decision.
2 
Another variable of wide use in the literature has been the level of education of the 
parents. Parents with no or little education are more likely to choose work options for their 
children.
3  This variable is also a main determinant of income and, therefore, suggests that if 
parent income is poorly measured, the presence of this variable in a regression may be absorbing 
the effect of income as well. This finding is observed also in developed countries as shown by 
Micklewright (1989) for the United Kingdom, Kodde and Ritzen (1988) for the Netherlands, Kane 
                                                           
2 It is relatively difficult to find studies which include wealth data. That is why it has been relatively hard to test the 
hypothesis of borrowing constraints. 
3 See Heckman and Hotzs (1986), Grootaert and Kanbur (1995), Akabayashi and Psacharopoulos (1999), 
Canagarajah and Coulombe (1997), and Levison and Moe (1998). 
  10(1994) for the United States, and González López-Varcárcel and Dávila Quintana (1997) and 
Pertongolo and San Segundo (1999) for Spain.
4 For these countries, both the occupational and 
educational level of the household head represent strong determinants of enrollment in secondary 
education. 
Greater family size tends to reduce the school enrollment rate of children and makes it 
more likely that the child works (Grootaert, 1998). However, Akabayashi and Psacharopoulos 
(1999) find that a greater number of children increases the probability of going to school. One 
may find explanations for both effects. Having a large family may imply that resources have to 
be divided over more members and therefore a poor family may not be able to afford sending a 
child to school. That may be the case, especially when there are monetary costs associated with 
going to school. On the other hand, a large family may mean that there are enough members to 
meet labor needs and that some children can go to school. This situation may predominate in 
peasant economies that are relatively short of labor and where children would not be sent to 
school unless it can be guaranteed that farm work will be done. In this sense, the number of 
siblings seems to have a positive impact on girls’ school attendance (Levison and Moe, 1998). 
That measure is, however, highly correlated with family size.  
It is noteworthy that the working-studying behavior of boys and of girls is different. Girls 
are less likely to attend school exclusively, they are less likely to combine work and school 
relative to working exclusively, and they are more likely to undertake home care tasks (Grootaert 
and Kanbur, 1995; Grootaert, 1998). The following sections present findings on the determinants 
of school attendance and child employment as well as estimates of the degree to which there 




The initial Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) dataset consists of household survey data 
from 15 Latin American countries for individuals of all ages,
5 but this paper confines itself to a 
                                                           
4 Gains from parental education seem however to fade away beyond secondary education. Interestingly, Alba and San 
Segundo (1995) and San Segundo (1997) show that human capital increases beyond secondary schooling keep raising 
parents’ income, although they do not seem to affect the educational demand of children. This result would suggest that 
low educational levels of parents (below secondary education) act as a cultural rather than economic barrier in 
determining youngsters’ demand for education. 
5 For a more thorough explanation of the source of the raw data and potential problems associated with the IDB 
dataset please refer to Behrman, Duryea and Székely (1999). 
  11dataset limited to those countries for which rural/urban data exist. In order to make the analysis 
manageable, the sample is further restricted to groups of 5 or 6 countries that are representative 
of the region. Table 1 contains the list of countries, years of the surveys, and sample sizes. 
The variables that are used may be classified into two categories:  adolescent-specific and 
household-specific.   
Adolescent-specific variables are the following: 
1. Age 
2. Sex 
3. Years of education 
4. School enrollment status 
5. Employment status 
6. Employment activity 
7. Reason for not attending school 
8. Ethnicity 
9. Hours Worked 
 
Household-specific variables include: 
1. Number of kids in HH 
2. Number of adolescents in HH 
3. Number of adults in HH 
4. Number of elderly in HH 
5. Father’s years of education 
6. Mother’s years of education 
7. Head of household income 
8. Head of household employment activity (agriculture, etc) 
9. Head of household employment type (independent, etc) 
 
While the majority of the relevant variables in the harmonized IDB dataset were 
comparable across countries, there was a significant exception.  Household income, reported in 
local currency terms, is normalized when presented in tables and a log transformation is used in 
the regression analysis. 
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Country Year Region Adolescents Households
Bolivia 1997 Rural 3,078 1,651
Urban 5,210 2,784
Brazil 1997 Rural 13,388 7,151
Urban 54,869 32,962
Dominican Republic 1996 Rural 1,718 932
Urban 3,169 1,827
Ecuador 1998 Rural 2,768 1,370
Urban 2,767 1,644
Guatemala 1998 Rural 2,571 1,202
Urban 5,791 3,020
Mexico 1996 Rural 7,254 3,465
Urban 6,710 3,699
Nicaragua 1998 Rural 2,808 1,235
Urban 2,857 1,438
Panama 1997 Rural 3,781 2,130
Urban 3,641 2,240
Peru 1997 Rural 1,630 829
Urban 2,352 1,304
El Salvador 1998 Rural 5,467 2,718
Urban 6,536 3,755  
 
4. Descriptive Statistics 
 
As documented by Duryea and Szekely (1998), there has been a slow increase in educational 
attainment in all Latin American countries compared with other areas of the world. They also 
show that, with the exception of Chile, where enrollment rates are over 90 percent through age 
14, Latin American countries exhibit a steady drop in enrollment rates after children reach age 
12. The patterns look even worse if one goes deeper and decomposes time allocation into four 
states.  
The graphs in Appendix 1 show, by age, the proportion of adolescents of rural and urban 
areas who are only in school, who work and study, who only work and who do neither of these 
options for each country. If one just looks at school enrollment in rural and urban areas, one may 
not find strong differences for some countries, and moreover, these differences may not be large 
even among Latin American countries. However, if one looks at the percentages of the 
mentioned four states, for all countries the following general picture emerges:  
 
the percentage of children who only study is lower for older adolescents; 
the percentage of children who work and study by age shows an inverted U-shape; 
the percentage of children who work only is higher for older adolescents; 
the percentage of children who do neither activity is higher for older adolescents. 
  13It is noteworthy that Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Peru show a high percentage 
of children who work and study. In addition, it is in these same countries that adolescents start 
off with a relatively low “school only” enrollment rate. It is especially in these countries where 
school enrollment, already lower than in others, does not provide an accurate picture of the 
educational reality. In Peru, for example, the enrollment rate at age 11 is above 98 percent, both 
in rural and urban areas. However, in rural areas almost 50 percent of all adolescents work and 
study at that age, whereas in urban areas only 9 percent of adolescents work at the same age.  
Table 2 shows some characteristics of the typical 15-year-old and reveals some of the 
fundamental differences between urban and rural youth.  In rural areas, 15-year-old adolescents 
already lag behind their urban counterparts in accumulation of human capital (2 years of formal 
education or more).  This is not inconsistent with the breakdown by attendance/work category.  
The share of rural 15-year-olds who only study is much lower than that found in urban areas, and 
the share who are working (either school+work or just working) is considerably higher.   
Interestingly, of those who do work, it is urban youth who work longer hours.  It is very 
important to note, however, that in urban areas the percentage of adolescents working is much 
smaller to begin with.  Family and household differences are consistent across countries.  Rural 
youth belong to poorer households with less educated parents than their urban counterparts.  On 
average the household income of urban adolescents is 2 or more times as great as that of rural 
adolescents, while the parents or urban adolescents have three or more years of education than 
the parents of rural adolescents.  The percentages of adolescents who only study is drastically 
different between urban and rural youth (a fact that is not readily visible from looking at 
enrollment rates).  These facts are in-line with the notion that socio-economic household 
characteristics are important determinants of school-work equations—a proposition that will be 
tested using regression analysis. 
 








Work Only Neither Agriculture Hours 
Worked
HH Income HH Years of 
Educ
HH Years of 
Educ (2)
HH Agric. HH Agric. (2) HH Indep
Bolivia Rural 5.6 20.2% 35.6% 33.9% 10.2% 87.5% 17.8 1.0 3.4 1.7 82.2% 52.1% 87.2%
Urban 7.7 78.1% 11.9% 6.9% 3.1% 10.5% 28.7 3.2 8.5 5.4 5.0% 1.2% 46.3%
Brazil Rural 3.9 38.1% 31.1% 19.5% 11.3% 79.9% 12.8 1.0 2.1 2.1 68.7% 44.5% 52.4%
Urban 5.6 66.4% 18.0% 6.3% 9.3% 6.8% 14.1 2.7 5.4 4.2 9.0% 3.3% 31.0%
Dominican Rural 6.7 81.3% 6.0% 6.4% 6.3% -- -- 1.0 5.1 3.6 30.0% 1.6% 51.2%
Republic Urban 7.4 84.4% 8.5% 2.9% 4.2% -- -- 1.7 7.6 5.1 9.5% 0.5% 39.2%
Ecuador Rural 6.5 20.2% 30.1% 36.6% 13.0% 60.3% 30.6 1.0 4.1 3.4 58.0% 29.1% 65.3%
Urban 7.8 55.3% 22.0% 12.9% 9.8% 7.3% 29.1 2.4 8.9 6.7 6.8% 2.3% 44.3%
Guatemala Rural 3.5 18.9% 10.2% 40.2% 30.7% 84.2% 30.0 1.0 1.7 1.0 60.8% 5.6% 43.5%
Urban 6.1 61.6% 9.8% 19.5% 9.1% 24.2% 31.0 2.1 5.9 3.3 12.4% 1.4% 45.3%
Mexico Rural 6.7 39.6% 8.2% 30.1% 21.8% 57.5% 23.5 1.0 3.6 2.8 49.8% 16.2% 45.6%
Urban 8.1 72.6% 3.1% 8.7% 13.7% 0.0% 28.7 2.2 7.3 5.2 3.0% 0.7% 25.2%
Nicaragua Rural 4.0 30.5% 9.6% 26.7% 31.2% 82.4% 22.8 1.0 1.5 1.4 57.7% 6.4% 46.8%
Urban 6.4 72.5% 4.6% 10.0% 12.2% 18.3% 31.6 2.4 5.4 3.5 14.2% 1.3% 32.8%
Panama Rural 7.0 62.0% 2.8% 17.0% 18.2% 22.8% 14.2 1.0 5.6 3.9 42.1% 1.4% 47.5%
Urban 8.0 90.7% 1.6% 1.7% 6.0% -- 38.8 2.9 9.5 7.1 2.9% 0.4% 18.3%
Peru Rural 6.6 32.5% 39.4% 21.9% 6.2% 88.8% 15.2 1.0 4.7 2.9 75.2% 53.1% 72.8%
Urban 7.8 72.5% 18.9% 4.1% 4.5% 12.5% 17.1 2.4 8.7 6.1 6.6% 1.7% 36.7%
El Salvador Rural 4.8 45.0% 13.0% 20.6% 21.4% 70.3% 31.3 1.0 2.5 1.7 52.5% 2.5% 46.8%
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(School Only, School and Work, Work Only, Neither) shows some consistent patterns across 
countries.  Table 3 presents household income and parent’s education, as well as household 
composition by category. 
 
Table 3. Household Characteristics of Rural Adolescents 
 
HH Income Hhyedc HHyedc2 Kids Adols Adult Elder
Bolivia School Only 1.0 4.6 2.5 1.6 2.4 2.2 0.1
School+Work 0.5 4.3 2.0 1.8 2.2 2.1 0.1
Work Only 0.5 2.6 1.0 1.2 2.3 2.1 0.2
Neither 0.6 2.7 1.3 1.6 2.3 2.3 0.1
Brazil School Only 1.0 2.4 2.5 1.1 2.4 2.3 0.1
School+Work 0.8 1.8 2.1 1.2 2.6 2.4 0.1
Work Only 0.7 1.4 1.4 1.1 2.6 2.4 0.2
Neither 0.7 1.7 1.6 1.1 2.2 2.2 0.2
Colombia School Only 1.0 3.9 3.3 1.2 2.4 2.4 0.2
School+Work 0.9 3.3 2.8 1.2 2.5 2.3 0.2
Work Only 0.9 2.4 2.1 1.2 2.5 2.5 0.2
Neither 0.8 2.6 2.1 1.3 2.4 2.5 0.2
Dominican ReSchool Only 1.0 5.1 4.3 0.9 2.3 2.4 0.2
School+Work 1.1 4.2 3.1 0.9 2.6 2.4 0.1
Work Only 1.0 3.5 2.1 0.9 2.6 2.7 0.2
Neither 0.9 4.1 3.5 1.0 2.0 2.2 0.2
Ecuador School Only 1.0 5.2 4.3 1.4 2.5 2.5 0.2
School+Work 0.8 4.4 3.5 1.4 2.6 2.6 0.2
Work Only 0.8 3.3 2.3 1.6 2.8 2.6 0.2
Neither 0.7 3.7 3.3 1.5 2.8 2.7 0.2
Honduras School Only 1.0 3.1 2.4 1.9 2.7 2.4 0.2
School+Work 1.3 3.6 2.2 1.7 2.6 2.5 0.2
Work Only 1.0 2.3 1.7 1.9 2.9 2.4 0.2
Neither 0.9 2.3 1.8 1.9 2.8 2.4 0.1
Mexico School Only 1.0 4.0 3.3 1.6 2.6 2.6 0.1
School+Work 0.9 3.5 3.0 1.6 2.8 2.6 0.1
Work Only 1.0 2.5 1.9 1.6 2.9 2.7 0.1
Neither 0.8 2.6 2.2 1.7 2.8 2.6 0.1
Nicaragua School Only 1.0 2.9 2.3 2.1 2.8 2.7 0.1
School+Work 1.1 1.9 1.5 2.0 2.9 2.7 0.1
Work Only 0.7 1.2 0.9 2.2 3.1 2.6 0.2
Neither 0.8 1.6 1.4 2.1 2.8 2.7 0.1
Panama School Only 1.0 6.1 4.9 1.2 2.3 2.3 0.2
School+Work 1.3 6.1 3.7 1.6 2.4 2.0 0.1
Work Only 0.8 4.2 3.2 1.1 2.4 2.4 0.1
Neither 0.8 4.7 3.6 1.4 2.3 2.4 0.1
Peru School Only 1.0 5.9 4.0 1.7 2.5 2.5 0.2
School+Work 0.7 5.6 3.2 1.9 2.4 2.4 0.1
Work Only 0.6 4.3 2.2 1.7 2.5 2.4 0.2
Neither 0.7 4.5 2.3 1.6 2.3 2.6 0.2
El Salvador School Only 1.0 2.7 1.8 1.6 2.6 2.5 0.2
School+Work 1.0 2.4 1.6 1.8 2.7 2.4 0.2
Work Only 1.1 1.7 1.1 1.7 2.7 2.4 0.2
Neither 0.7 1.8 1.2 1.7 2.5 2.4 0.2 
 
In general, those adolescents in the “school only” category belong to wealthier 
households with more educated parents.  Income was normalized to 1 for the “school only” 
category, and the data suggest that adolescents who work full-time belong to households that are 
  1660 to 70 percent as wealthy as those of adolescents who study full-time.  Parental education is 
also higher for school-only adolescents, although the size of the gap depends on the country.   
This is very suggestive of a relationship between these household characteristics and the school-
work decision. 
Although there is a much higher percentage of rural adolescents who work (both part-
time and full-time) than urban youth, the hours that urban youth work are generally greater.  
Table 4 shows that the median work week for rural adolescents is 14-25 hours long, while urban 
adolescents work between 25 and 40 hours a week.   
 
Table 4. Weekly Hours Worked by Percentile 
 
25th 50th 75th 99th
B o l i v i a R u r a l 1 01 51 86 0
Urban 13 24 42 84
B r a z i l R u r a l 2 02 23 56 3
Urban 20 40 44 70
C o l o m b i a R u r a l 1 52 13 87 0
Urban 20 30 48 72
Costa Rica Rural 11 28 48 70
Urban 12 35 48 66
Ecuador Rural 10 20 36 84
Urban 12 28 48 90
Guatemala Rural 24 30 45 63
Urban 20 28 45 77
Honduras Rural 14 24 40 128
Urban 20 35 45 76
M e x i c o R u r a l 1 22 14 08 6
Urban 15 24 40 65
Nicaragua Rural 16 25 42 72
Urban 18 28 48 77
Panama Rural 0 15 24 60
Urban 18 28 48 50
Peru Rural 8 14 21 54
U r b a n 8 1 42 46 9
El Salvador Rural 18 28 38 84
Urban 20 30 48 98  
 
In the rural context, part-time work may prevent complete dropout from school by 
complementing the low levels of family income while maintaining some level of school 
attendance. Those rural adolescents who work, however, work long hours (upwards of 20 hours 
per week with the exception of Panama and Peru).  Since working hours compete with study 
  17time, to the extent that there exists a trade-off highly intensive work weeks are particularly 
troublesome. 
Beyond the rural-urban education gap, are there further gaps specific to rural areas?   
Specifically, does ethnicity play a role in the study-work equations for rural adolescents?  Table 
5 groups rural adolescents into indigenous and non-indigenous categories.  Guatemala’s survey 
uses these categories, and the rest, with the exception of Brazil, were defined on the basis of the 
native language.  In the case of Brazil, the separation was white and non-white. 
As the table shows, indigenous rural youth have lower attendance rates (with the sole 
exception of Peru) and higher employment rates.  In addition, non-indigenous rural adolescents 
belong to households that are 20 percent (Peru) to 70 percent (Brazil) wealthier than indigenous 
youth.  This indicates that in Latin America it is not only rural youth who are disadvantaged but 
also that within rural areas indigenous populations are more severely affected. 
 
Table 5. Ethnic Differences Among Rural Adolescents 
Country Ethnicity Attend Employed HH Income*
Hours 
Worked **
Bolivia Non-Indigenous 74.5% 52.0% 1.6 16.5
Indigenous 35.9% 73.7% 1.0 16.0
Brazil Non-Indigenous 75.1% 42.4% 1.7 27.1
Indigenous 72.6% 43.0% 1.0 26.4
Ecuador Non-Indigenous 62.4% 55.5% 1.5 25.8
Indigenous 61.0% 89.3% 1.0 19.1
Guatemala Non-Indigenous 53.4% 31.0% 1.3 35.7
Indigenous 47.7% 42.6% 1.0 31.3
Peru Non-Indigenous 76.7% 53.6% 1.2 15.3
Indigenous 84.1% 78.5% 1.0 15.9  
 
The regression analysis presented in Section 5 will attempt to address the study-work 
decision that rural adolescents make.  However, it is interesting to look at the reasons the 
adolescents themselves give for not attending school.  Seven of the household surveys 
specifically asked of the adolescent their reason for non-attendance.  The particular options 
varied across surveys. In order to make comparisons between urban and rural youth as well as 
between countries, the possible answers have been grouped into one of four categories: 
economic, supply, performance, and other.  Economic reasons include the need to work, and lack 
of financial resources, while supply reasons include availability of schools, teachers, and 
materials. 
  18A striking result from Table 6 is that while economic reasons are important for rural and 
urban adolescents in the seven countries for which data are available, supply reasons are mostly 
cited by rural adolescents.  Supply problems seem not to not be an issue in urban areas, while 
they are quite important for rural areas.  For example, 17.2 percent of Bolivian rural adolescents 
respond that supply problems are the reason for their non-attendance, while only 1 percent of 
urban adolescents in Bolivia gave this reason.  El Salvador is an exceptional case where supply 
problems are generalized and affect the entire population.  Once again, rural youth are quite 
disadvantaged compared to their urban counterparts.  
 
Table 6. Reasons for Non-Attendance 
 
Economic Supply Performance Other
Bolivia Rural 51.7 17.2 N.A. 30.0
Urban 52.1 1.0 N.A. 46.5
Chile Rural 58.2 3.7 9.5 28.7
Urban 46.6 1.3 8.2 44.0
Dominican Republic Rural 21.0 1.6 4.0 73.3
Urban 26.5 0.9 4.2 68.4
Guatemala Rural 39.3 4.3 N.A. 56.5
Urban 53.3 0.2 N.A. 46.6
Nicaragua Rural 64.7 12.3 N.A. 23.0
Urban 65.5 1.4 N.A. 33.1
Panama Rural 60.3 4.1 N.A. 35.6
Urban 43.6 2.2 N.A. 54.2
El Salvador Rural 37.5 27.5 17.9 16.9
Urban 40.4 24.8 16.8 18.0 
 




The regression analysis uses the two dependent variables attend and emp, which are dummy 
variables where a value of 1 signifies attendance and employment, respectively. The empirical 
approach often adopted in this literature is to run probit/logit regressions on the observed 
variables of school attendance and employment and tobit estimations of hours worked.  Some 
studies have estimated bivariate probability models to try to better model the interdependency 
(trade-off) between work and schooling.  Others studies have ranked child/adolescent outcomes 
according to some normative criterion (e.g., full-time schooling is better than part-time 
schooling, etc).  There are benefits and drawbacks to each of these approaches.  Still, while 
gauging the degree to which child labor displaces schooling was of interest, it did not seem 
necessary to impose any ranking on the model.  Bivariate probit models are therefore estimated 
with both school attendance and employment as dependent variables for each country in the 
sample for rural areas (the urban regressions are presented in Appendix 2 solely for comparison 
purposes). 
 
b. Bivariate Probit 
 
1 1 1* ε β + = X y  y 1=1 if y1*>0, 0 otherwise    Study equation 
 
1 2 2* ε β + = X y  y 2=1 if y2*>0, 0 otherwise    Work equation 
 
[] []0 2 1 = = ε ε E E  
 
[] []1 2 1 = = ε ε Var Var  
 
[] ρ ε ε = 2 1, Corr  
 
In this model, the two equations (study and work) are not assumed to be independent but 
rather have a potentially non-zero correlation coefficient of the error terms.  A more negative 
correlation coefficient suggests a stronger “trade-off” between work and school. 
 
  20c. Results 
 
The literature on child labor and schooling participation rates has identified several critical 
factors.  The present analysis focuses on characteristics of adolescents and the household which 
can potentially impact the decision to allocate time away from schooling and towards work.   
There exists a large body of literature that links the parent’s education level to the 
adolescent’s school-labor decision.
6  The literature, however, is quite mixed on the subject of 
household size.  It is not evident whether larger households should increase or decrease the 
individual adolescent’s decision to remain in school or search for employment.  Consequently, it 
is more important to look at the composition of the household.  Greater numbers of children in a 
household will place a higher demand on family resources and might make the household unable 
to keep educating the adolescent members, while a greater number of adults or older siblings 
might provide relief to the household and free up resources which will allow the younger 
adolescent’s to remain in school.  Because it is apparently not the absolute size of the household 
that matters, but rather the composition of the household that will affect the school-work 
decision, we include a vector of size variables is included that captures the number of children, 
adolescents, adults, and elderly people.   
In terms of household economic conditions, the empirical literature suggests that family 
income is a key factor in parents’ decision to invest in the education of their children.  In the 
context of credit constraints, adolescent members of poorer families will often attend school only 
at the expense of their siblings.  In fact, much of the child labor literature views poverty as the 
most important determinant of the schooling decision.
7 Since overall family income is 
endogenous to the adolescent’s work status, the log of the adult income is taken as the measure 
of the family’s overall income level.  
Additionally, there is reason to believe that that parent’s employment activity as well as 
employment type is of importance.  An agriculture dummy, as well as an independent worker 
dummy for the head of household (and spouse), is introduced to capture these potential effects. 
Table 8 presents the results from a bivariate probit analysis of rural adolescents between 
the ages of 10 and 18 for a sample of 10 Latin American countries.  The dependent variables of 
the two equation are attendance and work variables attend, emp, which take on values of 1 and 0. 
                                                           
6 See Grootaert (1998), Akabayashi and Psacharopoulos (1999), Castañeda and Aldaz-Carroll (1999) and Jacoby 
(1994). 
  21The measure of household income lincome (log of income of all adult household 
members) is a significant determinant of the study-work decision in most cases.  In the 
exceptional cases where this variable is not statistically significant it could be due to the fact that 
parental education may be partially capturing this effect.  To the extent that parental income is 
associated with parental education a strong correlation could result in low statistical significance 
of the income variable. 
The number of kids (children up to 9 years of age) in the household tends to lower the 
probabilities of attendance and raises the probabilities of employment of the adolescent siblings, 
while the number of adolescents, adults, and elderly (adols, adult, elder) does not have clear 
effects. 
The educational level of the head of the household and the spouse (hhyedc, hhyedc2) 
positively affect the probability of attendance as well as lower the probabilities of employment, 
as expected. 
The employment status of the head of household and the spouse raise the probabilities of 
school attendance while at the same time lowering the probability of adolescent employment.  
This is consistent with the idea that child labor is used to mitigate low household income. 
Finally, the degree to which there exists a “trade-off” between study and work is captured 
in the rho (the correlation coefficient between the error terms).  Table 8 further shows that these 
correlation coefficients are all negative and statistically different from zero.  The evidence of this 






                                                                                                                                                                                           
7 See Jacoby (1994), Castañeda and Aldaz-Carroll (1999), Canagarajah and Coulombe (1997) and Grootaert (1998). 
  22Table 8. Regressions Rural Adolescents 
 
i Bolivia Brazil Domin can Republic Ecuador Guatemala
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
attend emp attend emp attend emp attend emp attend emp
edad -0.451 0.201 -0.320 0.191 -0.484 0.313 -0.460 0.146 -0.443 0.267
(0.016)** (0.012)** (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.027)** (0.024)** (0.017)** (0.013)** (0.017)** (0.013)**
yedc 0.237 -0.078 0.153 -0.006 0.306 -0.133 0.284 -0.019 0.278 -0.050
(0.015)** (0.013)** (0.007)** (0.006) (0.021)** (0.018)** (0.017)** (0.014) (0.016)** (0.013)**
sex -0.251 -0.276 0.013 -0.957 -0.085 -1.222 -0.100 -0.785 -0.124 -1.045
(0.058)** (0.050)** (0.027) (0.025)** (0.097) (0.118)** (0.059) (0.053)** (0.060)* (0.061)**
kids -0.015 0.061 -0.020 0.037 -0.007 -0.012 -0.062 0.031 0.014 -0.006
(0.021) (0.018)** (0.010)* (0.010)** (0.041) (0.040) (0.021)** (0.019) (0.020) (0.019)
adols 0.013 -0.059 0.074 0.049 0.137 0.127 -0.052 0.042 -0.019 0.047
(0.029) (0.024)* (0.011)** (0.010)** (0.044)** (0.043)** (0.024)* (0.022) (0.027) (0.025)
adult -0.002 -0.105 0.054 -0.004 -0.004 0.015 0.030 -0.038 0.020 -0.005
(0.034) (0.030)** (0.013)** (0.012) (0.040) (0.041) (0.026) (0.024) (0.030) (0.027)
elder 0.132 -0.011 0.015 0.068 -0.073 -0.061 0.063 -0.008 0.015 -0.096
(0.080) (0.068) (0.034) (0.033)* (0.106) (0.115) (0.066) (0.059) (0.080) (0.075)
lincome 0.021 -0.031 0.026 -0.032 0.051 0.000 0.016 -0.016 0.021 -0.044
(0.009)* (0.008)** (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.019)** (0.024) (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.014) (0.013)**
hhyedc 0.050 -0.021 0.001 -0.038 0.001 -0.006 0.036 -0.029 0.016 -0.053
(0.012)** (0.009)* (0.007) (0.006)** (0.015) (0.016) (0.012)** (0.010)** (0.013) (0.013)**
hhyedc2 0.023 -0.041 0.037 -0.041 -0.010 -0.064 0.029 -0.071 0.033 -0.016
(0.015) (0.012)** (0.007)** (0.006)** (0.016) (0.017)** (0.013)* (0.011)** (0.018) (0.017)
hhemp -0.434 0.705 -0.006 0.577 -0.207 0.287 -0.193 0.622 0.003 0.383
(0.153)** (0.127)** (0.047) (0.046)** (0.139) (0.142)* (0.122) (0.109)** (0.107) (0.107)**
hhemp2 0.163 1.002 0.127 0.734 -0.170 0.496 0.077 0.779 -0.052 0.300
(0.061)** (0.054)** (0.028)** (0.026)** (0.130) (0.128)** (0.063) (0.058)** (0.068) (0.066)**
hhsex 0.174 0.454 0.094 0.190 -0.308 0.205 0.062 0.195 0.114 0.004
(0.108) (0.090)** (0.047)* (0.045)** (0.146)* (0.146) (0.109) (0.096)* (0.100) (0.096)
Constant 5.727 -2.927 4.154 -3.137 6.169 -5.084 5.000 -1.813 5.053 -3.553
(0.268)** (0.215)** (0.105)** (0.099)** (0.419)** (0.416)** (0.259)** (0.217)** (0.252)** (0.229)**
No. Obs 3074 3074 13358 13358 1714 1714 2753 2753 2565 2565
Rho -0.44 -0.20 -0.47 -0.23 -0.46
(0.034) (0.018) (0.061) (0.040) (0.035)
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
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Mexico Nicaragua Panama Peru El Salvador
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
attend emp attend emp attend emp attend emp attend emp
edad -0.558 0.348 -0.393 0.214 -0.527 0.347 -0.466 0.124 -0.424 0.224
(0.012)** (0.009)** (0.015)** (0.013)** (0.017)** (0.016)** (0.026)** (0.018)** (0.011)** (0.009)**
yedc 0.262 -0.063 0.269 -0.062 0.277 -0.118 0.237 -0.043 0.284 -0.060
(0.011)** (0.008)** (0.015)** (0.014)** (0.015)** (0.014)** (0.024)** (0.020)* (0.010)** (0.009)**
sex -0.176 -0.872 0.002 -1.540 0.002 -1.116 -0.052 -0.446 -0.142 -1.053
(0.038)** (0.039)** (0.057) (0.065)** (0.056) (0.070)** (0.084) (0.067)** (0.041)** (0.043)**
kids -0.034 0.040 -0.005 0.006 -0.041 0.048 -0.009 0.085 -0.027 0.068
(0.014)* (0.013)** (0.017) (0.018) (0.020)* (0.022)* (0.031) (0.025)** (0.013)* (0.013)**
adols -0.022 0.052 0.037 0.008 0.030 0.015 0.030 -0.047 0.053 0.026
(0.016) (0.015)** (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.040) (0.031) (0.017)** (0.017)
adult 0.041 -0.032 0.044 -0.037 0.053 -0.100 0.005 -0.096 0.082 -0.066
(0.017)* (0.016)* (0.024) (0.025) (0.026)* (0.029)** (0.036) (0.031)** (0.019)** (0.019)**
elder 0.071 -0.050 0.080 0.057 0.123 -0.064 -0.144 -0.087 0.091 -0.121
(0.047) (0.046) (0.069) (0.071) (0.071) (0.080) (0.097) (0.081) (0.048) (0.048)*
lincome 0.032 -0.023 0.009 -0.022 0.018 -0.013 0.003 0.001 -0.002 -0.006
(0.006)** (0.006)** (0.005) (0.005)** (0.006)** (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002)**
hhyedc 0.039 -0.042 0.045 -0.041 0.029 -0.034 0.038 -0.007 0.030 -0.041
(0.007)** (0.007)** (0.013)** (0.013)** (0.009)** (0.010)** (0.015)* (0.012) (0.009)** (0.008)**
hhyedc2 0.027 -0.020 0.030 -0.036 0.017 -0.034 0.014 -0.068 0.027 -0.025
(0.008)** (0.008)* (0.015)* (0.015)* (0.010) (0.011)** (0.018) (0.013)** (0.011)* (0.010)*
hhemp -0.130 0.324 0.015 0.464 -0.121 0.447 -0.100 0.524 -0.096 0.495
(0.065)* (0.064)** (0.087) (0.093)** (0.086) (0.099)** (0.179) (0.145)** (0.061) (0.062)**
hhemp2 0.075 0.486 -0.021 0.295 0.190 0.280 0.154 0.873 0.134 0.321
(0.043) (0.041)** (0.074) (0.077)** (0.082)* (0.086)** (0.094) (0.078)** (0.053)* (0.051)**
hhsex 0.144 0.221 0.014 0.250 0.221 0.073 0.089 0.411 0.144 0.131
(0.073)* (0.069)** (0.083) (0.085)** (0.089)* (0.094) (0.167) (0.137)** (0.060)* (0.058)*
Constant 6.411 -5.090 4.114 -2.888 6.078 -4.963 5.817 -1.644 4.840 -3.498
(0.166)** (0.156)** (0.221)** (0.221)** (0.241)** (0.260)** (0.395)** (0.290)** (0.163)** (0.155)**
No. Obs 7236 7236 2711 2711 3774 3774 1630 1630 5448 5448
Rho -0.54 -0.30 -0.76 -0.18 -0.40
(0.021) (0.038) (0.023) (0.056) (0.026)
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
 
  246. Summary 
 
Rural adolescents are extremely disadvantaged vis-à-vis their urban counterparts.  In general 
they belong to poorer households, their parents are less educated, their families are larger, and 
there is a relative scarcity of schools, teachers and materials. 
It is sometimes argued that the flexibility that allows for part-time study accompanied by 
work may not be a bad thing insofar as the alternative might be complete dropout from school.  
In the theoretical literature it has been argued that child labor is not Pareto optimal when child 
labor is used to transfer income from children to parents in the form of negative bequests or 
when it is used as a replacement for borrowing in the context of credit constraints. 
Rural Latin America is quite credit constrained.  Families often do not have high levels of 
wealth and credit is scarce.  It is within this framework that rural families often have to self-
finance any investments including those in human capital.  The opportunity costs to rural 
households of sending their children to school can therefore be quite high and in many cases 
prohibitive.  This is especially true for agricultural families during harvest season. 
Indigenous adolescents are the hardest hit part of rural Latin America.  Their family 
income is considerably smaller and their parents are even less educated than those of non-
indigenous rural adolescents.  Attendance rates are lower and child labor is even more prevalent. 
Supply-side problems are much more problematic and endemic to rural areas.  According 
to the respondents, scarcity of schools, teacher, and materials represent important reasons for 
non-attendance.  This suggests that even in the absence of the problems associated with lower 
income, there is a problem due to scarcity of schooling infrastructure. 
Finally, there seems to be a strong “trade-off” effect between study and work.  Resources 
dedicated to adolescent labor detract from the process of accumulation of human capital.  This is 
most readily seen when comparing the educational attainment of rural adolescents vis-à-vis their 
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  41Appendix 2. Urban Regressions 
 
i Bolivia Brazil Domin can Republic Ecuador Guatemala
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
attend emp attend emp attend emp attend emp attend emp
edad -0.425 0.252 -0.361 0.237 -0.432 0.281 -0.507 0.170 -0.458 0.268
(0.018)** (0.014)** (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.022)** (0.019)** (0.023)** (0.015)** (0.014)** (0.011)**
yedc 0.244 -0.115 0.170 0.016 0.210 -0.069 0.323 -0.039 0.297 -0.088
(0.014)** (0.012)** (0.004)** (0.003)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.020)** (0.015)** (0.012)** (0.009)**
sex -0.074 -0.329 -0.012 -0.487 0.107 -0.944 0.042 -0.490 -0.202 -0.466
(0.059) (0.048)** (0.015) (0.014)** (0.074) (0.078)** (0.072) (0.056)** (0.048)** (0.043)**
kids -0.075 0.067 -0.124 0.048 -0.056 0.025 -0.133 0.042 -0.085 0.078
(0.023)** (0.018)** (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.031) (0.031) (0.030)** (0.025) (0.018)** (0.017)**
adols 0.111 0.032 0.067 0.034 0.079 0.061 -0.038 0.065 0.027 0.012
(0.027)** (0.021) (0.007)** (0.006)** (0.033)* (0.030)* (0.033) (0.025)* (0.020) (0.018)
adult 0.008 -0.038 0.068 -0.032 0.065 0.064 0.029 -0.009 0.027 -0.061
(0.027) (0.023) (0.007)** (0.006)** (0.030)* (0.027)* (0.033) (0.025) (0.021) (0.019)**
elder -0.159 0.133 0.142 -0.045 0.005 -0.064 0.150 -0.053 0.097 -0.091
(0.079)* (0.069) (0.022)** (0.021)* (0.082) (0.080) (0.089) (0.070) (0.053) (0.049)
lincome 0.004 -0.020 0.017 -0.034 0.015 -0.034 0.002 -0.024 0.034 -0.034
(0.010) (0.008)** (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.013) (0.012)** (0.011) (0.010)* (0.011)** (0.010)**
hhyedc 0.026 -0.029 0.032 -0.041 0.017 -0.019 0.040 -0.054 0.046 -0.049
(0.008)** (0.006)** (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.009) (0.009)* (0.010)** (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.006)**
hhyedc2 0.018 -0.037 0.028 -0.036 0.017 -0.011 0.027 -0.037 0.014 -0.025
(0.009)* (0.007)** (0.003)** (0.002)** (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)* (0.008)** (0.009) (0.007)**
hhemp -0.083 0.366 0.028 0.342 0.001 -0.012 0.058 0.581 -0.080 0.360
(0.093) (0.080)** (0.020) (0.020)** (0.098) (0.094) (0.114) (0.098)** (0.074) (0.069)**
hhemp2 0.048 0.352 0.066 0.343 0.043 0.073 0.047 0.613 0.012 0.364
(0.068) (0.055)** (0.018)** (0.016)** (0.104) (0.095) (0.083) (0.066)** (0.055) (0.051)**
hhsex 0.034 0.125 0.103 0.017 -0.012 0.075 0.124 0.129 0.155 0.031
(0.087) (0.071) (0.021)** (0.019) (0.105) (0.103) (0.109) (0.087) (0.067)* (0.061)
Constant 5.656 -3.865 4.899 -4.113 5.761 -4.516 5.654 -2.425 5.430 -3.864
(0.267)** (0.201)** (0.063)** (0.057)** (0.340)** (0.306)** (0.338)** (0.247)** (0.215)** (0.184)**
No. Obs 5128 5128 54448 54448 3114 3114 2713 2713 5648 5648
Rho -0.53 -0.24 -0.44 -0.27 -0.52
(0.032) (0.010) (0.047) (0.046) (0.026)
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
 
 
  42Mexico Nicaragua Panama Peru El Salvador
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
attend emp attend emp attend emp attend emp attend emp
edad -0.574 0.357 -0.427 0.259 -0.571 0.421 -0.465 0.177 -0.431 0.226
(0.015)** (0.013)** (0.018)** (0.016)** (0.025)** (0.030)** (0.026)** (0.019)** (0.013)** (0.010)**
yedc 0.305 -0.085 0.298 -0.090 0.307 -0.138 0.152 -0.010 0.273 -0.079
(0.012)** (0.010)** (0.016)** (0.014)** (0.019)** (0.021)** (0.021)** (0.019) (0.010)** (0.009)**
sex -0.145 -0.394 0.064 -0.568 -0.005 -0.434 -0.072 -0.197 -0.119 -0.344
(0.045)** (0.046)** (0.065) (0.066)** (0.073) (0.088)** (0.080) (0.063)** (0.043)** (0.042)**
kids -0.098 0.080 -0.068 0.103 -0.084 0.099 -0.076 0.066 -0.061 0.042
(0.020)** (0.020)** (0.022)** (0.022)** (0.032)** (0.038)** (0.037)* (0.029)* (0.017)** (0.016)*
adols -0.079 0.066 0.027 -0.030 0.011 -0.023 -0.038 0.026 0.092 0.014
(0.019)** (0.019)** (0.025) (0.025) (0.035) (0.042) (0.036) (0.028) (0.019)** (0.018)
adult 0.036 -0.092 0.057 -0.070 0.018 -0.099 -0.003 -0.103 0.099 -0.084
(0.019) (0.020)** (0.026)* (0.026)** (0.031) (0.039)* (0.031) (0.027)** (0.019)** (0.019)**
elder 0.082 -0.057 0.145 -0.095 0.095 -0.223 -0.014 -0.196 0.089 -0.107
(0.062) (0.063) (0.076) (0.077) (0.093) (0.118) (0.094) (0.086)* (0.048) (0.047)*
lincome 0.030 -0.017 0.032 -0.042 0.001 0.000 -0.029 -0.010 -0.003 -0.003
(0.010)** (0.008)* (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.014) (0.015) (0.011)* (0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
hhyedc 0.045 -0.033 0.045 -0.028 0.058 -0.013 0.025 -0.028 0.035 -0.032
(0.006)** (0.006)** (0.010)** (0.009)** (0.010)** (0.012) (0.012)* (0.009)** (0.006)** (0.006)**
hhyedc2 0.015 -0.038 -0.002 -0.031 0.040 -0.043 0.005 -0.032 0.020 -0.048
(0.008)* (0.008)** (0.012) (0.012)** (0.011)** (0.013)** (0.012) (0.009)** (0.008)** (0.007)**
hhemp -0.161 0.102 0.015 0.359 0.104 -0.130 0.238 0.334 -0.008 0.296
(0.068)* (0.068) (0.080) (0.086)** (0.090) (0.105) (0.124) (0.111)** (0.058) (0.059)**
hhemp2 0.042 0.359 -0.014 0.376 -0.281 0.349 -0.020 0.691 0.070 0.444
(0.052) (0.052)** (0.076) (0.076)** (0.096)** (0.114)** (0.087) (0.072)** (0.052) (0.051)**
hhsex 0.062 0.163 0.126 -0.048 0.189 -0.192 -0.236 0.448 0.142 -0.033
(0.073) (0.072)* (0.077) (0.077) (0.100) (0.118) (0.130) (0.108)** (0.053)** (0.052)
Constant 6.853 -5.340 4.723 -3.795 6.895 -6.300 6.986 -3.199 4.961 -3.643
(0.213)** (0.207)** (0.251)** (0.245)** (0.363)** (0.459)** (0.400)** (0.265)** (0.176)** (0.166)**
No. Obs 6651 6651 2757 2757 3597 3597 2351 2351 6489 6489
Rho -0.51 -0.40 -0.60 -0.25 -0.46
(0.027) (0.042) (0.045) (0.051) (0.026)
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
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